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5 
Problems and Recommendations 
No End of History 
A Chinese Alternative Concept of 
International Order? 
In the last three years, President Xi Jinping has used 
nearly every opportunity to announce new foreign 
policy initiatives. Most importantly, he emphasized 
the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (“China 
dream”) as the central goal of his political agenda. In 
addition, Xi described relations with the United States 
and Russia as a “new type of major power relation-
ship” that should be mainly built on mutual respect 
and recognition of national interests. He further re-
emphasized the significance of China’s neighboring 
countries, proclaimed the need for a “New Asian secu-
rity concept,” and kicked off the “One Belt, One Road” 
initiative. Among all these different announcements, 
OBOR clearly stands out. It is by far the most compre-
hensive and visible Chinese initiative of the last three 
years. OBOR not only replaces the concept of “har-
monious society/world” but also represents Xi’s cen-
tral instrument to actually realize the “China dream” 
and turn China into a great power again. OBOR has 
thus the potential to grow into an alternative idea 
showing how the common space of international 
politics could be organized in the future. Consequently, 
OBOR challenges the still dominating Western vision 
of the international system and could effectively trans-
form the existing structure of the current international 
order. 
For this reason, it is crucial to conceptualize Chi-
na’s OBOR initiative in a broader context. Instead of 
only focusing on specific mechanisms linked to OBOR, 
such as, for example, the Asia Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank (AIIB), it is necessary to develop a compre-
hensive analytical approach to OBOR. Before doing so, 
it makes sense to briefly discuss three major challeng-
es to the existing international order (the weakness 
of democracy, the competition of ideologies, and the 
increasing relevance of everyday practices in inter-
national politics) that increase the leverage for China 
(and other actors) to push forward alternative ideas 
of international order. 
In a nutshell, China’s OBOR initiative is regarded 
as a vision for building up a comprehensive cultural, eco-
nomic, and political network that promotes connectivity 
and cooperation between countries, regions, and cities 
along the Silk Road. Furthermore, the OBOR initiative 
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6 
is flexible, inclusive, and open. The geographic scope of 
the initiative has still not been determined, and the 
Chinese leadership has not yet published an official 
OBOR map. Thus, everyone who has an interest in the 
initiative – or in one of the institutions summarized 
under the OBOR initiative – can become part of it. 
OBOR itself is not an institution/organization, but as a 
network OBOR comprises many different institutions 
and mechanisms; even China’s bilateral relations 
are increasingly linked to the OBOR initiative. Con-
sequently, the newly established financial mecha-
nisms such as the AIIB or the Silk Road Fund as well 
as already existing multilateral mechanisms (BRICS or 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) are now seen 
as part of OBOR. In the OBOR network, cooperation is 
thus possible between all kinds of actors and in many 
different contexts. 
The main risk for European countries and the EU 
consists of the concentration in particular mecha-
nisms or even projects in the realm of OBOR. This 
could strengthen Chinese actors in playing, for in-
stance, individual European countries off against the 
European Union (EU), or the EU off against mecha-
nisms such as the Central and Eastern European 
forum with China (“16+1”). A focus on only specific 
elements of OBOR further conceals that most of these 
projects, mechanisms, and funds are part of a com-
prehensive network vision with a potential global 
outreach. 
Hence, European countries – particularly European 
foreign ministries – firstly, need to start collecting 
and distributing information about all Chinese OBOR 
activities in their countries. This would make it much 
easier for these countries to actively define in what 
areas they want – or do not want – to cooperate. Sec-
ondly, the newly established EU connectivity platform 
should not only serve as a platform for identifying 
joint infrastructure projects; it also needs to develop 
into the main center for coordinating all OBOR activ-
ities of Chinese actors in the EU. 
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Three Challenges to International Order 
 
In times of crises, experts and policymakers are faced 
with continuously new political events, an incredible 
amount of “facts” about these incidents happening all 
over the world, and an enormous as well as uncontrol-
lable speed of information. Moments of crisis are events 
that require actors to immediately articulate their 
interpretations and preferred choice of action. Crises 
are thus moments of dislocation and decisions, in 
which the political principles, values, and understand-
ings of actors are challenged and, at the same time, 
are in great need of being created again.1 
The many different international, regional, and 
local crises of the last years have revealed weak points 
of the existing international order, for instance regard-
ing the governance capability of global institutions, 
the difficulty of leading powers to translate their power 
into outcomes, or the growing struggle to maintain 
national coherence. Furthermore, the focus of Euro-
pean governments on the management of acute crises 
has often prevented discussions about a more funda-
mental challenge, that is, the development of alter-
native ideas of international order by other (non-West-
ern, non-state, etc.) actors. It is thus necessary that 
questions such as “What is international order?” are 
again discussed more comprehensively. After all, there 
exist many different understandings about how the 
space of international politics could be organized. 
Hence, it is crucial to seriously reflect on the question 
of what alternative concepts of order exist and how 
these concepts may challenge the existing order, its 
values, and its rules. 
Before I show how the OBOR initiative could be 
regarded as an alternative Chinese concept of inter-
national order, I firstly stress three key challenges to 
the existing structure of the international order: the 
weakness of democracy, the competition of ideologies, 
and the growing relevance of everyday practices in 
international politics. These challenges increase the 
leverage for actors such as China to promote their 
own understandings of international order. 
 
1  See Hillis Miller, “‘Taking Up a Task’: Moments of Decision 
in Ernesto Laclau’s Thought”, in Laclau: A Critical Reader, ed. 
Simon Critchley and Oliver Marchart (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 217–26. 
The Weakness of Democracy 
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the enthu-
siasm about “the triumph of the West” peaked in 
Francis Fukuyama’s famous claim that “What we may 
be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or 
the passing of a particular period of post-war history, 
but the end of history as such; that is, the end point of 
mankind’s ideological evolution and the universaliza-
tion of Western liberal democracy as the final form of 
human government.”2 Almost three decades later, this 
nearly exuberant self-confidence of the West has turned 
into quite the opposite. The end of history, and in 
particular the end of conflicting ideologies, was not 
achieved.3 Today, it is very obvious that democracies 
represent only one way to organize human coexist-
ence; besides, they are constantly being challenged by 
external crises as much as being tested by threats from 
the inside. In this regard, the many different crises of 
the last years (Greece, Russia/Ukraine, the refugee crisis, 
the challenge of ISIS, Occupy movements, etc.) under-
score the vulnerability of our democracies. 
This immanent weakness of democracy was also 
the topic of Giovanna Borradori’s interview with Jür-
gen Habermas and Jacques Derrida shortly after the 
September 11 attacks of 2001.4 In their discussion 
about the impact of these terrorist attacks on our 
lives, politics, and societies, Derrida emphasized the 
phenomenon of “democratic autoimmunity,” which 
describes a specific weakness of liberal democracy. 
The concept of autoimmunity derives from medical 
science. It describes the malfunction of the immune 
system. Normally, the immune system of a healthy 
human body responds to foreign materials but does 
not attack the body itself. When the immune system 
attacks the body (cells and tissues), we are speaking 
 
2  Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History”, The National Interest 
(1989): 1. 
3  See Oliver Lembcke, “Kein Ende in Sicht. Zur Rolle der Ideo-
logie in der Politik – aus Sicht der Politischen Theorie”, Zeit-
schrift für Politikwissenschaft 24, no. 1–2 (2014): 149–61. 
4  Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, Philosophy in a Time 
of Terror. Dialogues with Jürgen Habermann and Jacques Derrida, ed. 
by Giovanna Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003). 
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of an autoimmune disease.5 In the political context, 
Derrida uses this notion to highlight that democratic 
systems already incorporate the possibility of destruc-
tion and failure within its structure. Following this 
autoimmune logic, democratic governments are prone 
to “produce, invent, and feed the very monstrosity 
they claim to overcome.”6 
This leads to two very particular weaknesses of 
liberal democracy: firstly, the necessary openness 
of democracy always puts it at risk7; secondly, in 
response to internal or external crises, democratically 
legitimated governments might come to political 
decisions that stand in contrast to fundamental demo-
cratic principles and values. In other words, to protect 
democracy against its enemies, democracies some-
times refer to methods that are not democratic. Gior-
gio Agamben emphasizes this specific aspect in his 
discussion about the “state of exception” (Ausnahme-
zustand).8 Agamben relies on Carl Schmitt’s famous 
definition of sovereignty, which comprises the power 
to decide about the state of exception. Thus, in cases 
of exception (or emergency), the state is authorized to 
suspend the law due to its right to self-preservation.9 
Agamben understands the state of exception as “the 
original structure in which law encompasses living 
beings by means of its own suspension.”10 Derrida’s 
democratic autoimmunity and Agamben’s thinking 
 
5  See “Autoimmunity”, Nature Insight 435, no. 7042 (2005), 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v435/n7042/pdf/ 
435583a.pdf (accessed 31 August 2015). 
6  Derrida, at this juncture, mainly focusses on US policy 
before and after 9/11. Habermas and Derrida, Philosophy in 
a Time of Terror (see note 4), 99. 
7  Mouffe highlights: “On the one side, we have the liberal 
tradition constituted by the rule of law, the defence of human 
rights and the respect of individual liberty; on the other the 
democratic tradition whose main ideas are those of equality, 
identity between governing and governed and popular sov-
ereignty.” Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: 
Verso, 2005), 2–3. Taking a very simplified perspective, this 
means, for example, when democratic cities such as London, 
Paris, or Brussels turn into places of training for terrorists, 
or when young men and women who grew up in largely non-
Muslim democracies suddenly decide to support ISIS. Besides, 
it is also possible that “the apparently suicidal political open-
ness allows that a party hostile to democracy might be legiti-
mately elected”. Habermas and Derrida, Philosophy in a Time of 
Terror (see note 4), 101. 
8  Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
9  Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der 
Souveränität [1922], 8. ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), 
18–19. 
10  Agamben, State of Exception (see note 8), 3. 
about the state of exception represent structural el-
ements of democracy. In times of crises, these elements 
could, however, turn into weak spots of democracy, 
which then also become visible to outsiders, for in-
stance to China. 
Competition of Ideologies: 
Horizontal Complexity of the World 
The Eurocentric concept of international order has 
determined the understanding of international 
politics for nearly 200 years. In the atmosphere of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European 
thinkers generated a European identity “against the 
rest.” The idea of European superiority and the praxis 
of expansion grew together and created what John 
M. Hobson called “an imaginary line of civilisational 
apartheid that fundamentally separated or split East 
from West.”11 However, the invention of a Eurocentric 
worldview alone is not quite special (every great em-
pire tends to create a dominant and specific world-
view centered on itself). But what inevitably distin-
guishes Eurocentrism from other “isms” is that its 
ideas reached out to dominate every (academic, politi-
cal, territorial, etc.) realm, starting in (at least) the 
nineteenth century. Consequently, although many 
countries developed images, maps, or concepts of the 
world – and for a long time these different perspec-
tives co-existed or influenced each other – it is still, as 
Wigen and Lewis underscored: “With the triumph of 
European imperialism […] the contemporary European 
view of the divisions of the world came to enjoy near-
universal acceptance.”12 
In the last two decades, the Eurocentric concept 
of international order has clearly been challenged by 
a new variety of actors that are increasingly forcing 
traditional powers to seriously consider what they 
“want.” These are, for instance, states such as Brazil, 
India, China, and Turkey, which alone or together 
 
11  See John M. Hobson, “Is Critical Theory Always for the 
White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond Westphalia 
towards a Post-Racist Critical IR”, Review of International Studies 
33, no. S1 (2007): 94. 
12  See Martin W. Lewis and Kären, The Myth of Continents. A 
Critique of Metageography (Berkeley et al.: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1997), 33. This is not only regarding the regional 
divisions of the world but is also the case for the emergence 
of international/regional institutions as well as the success of 
the Westphalian nation-state as the most important container 
of politics. 
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(for instance in the framework of BRICS) raise their 
voices and develop their own ideas about the future 
structure of the international order (or parts of this 
structure). Thus, they are no longer mere objects but 
(again) become subjects of international politics.13 
In addition, the rising number of powerful non-state 
actors, transnational groups, and global players fur-
ther challenges the principles, norms, and values of 
the existing international order.14 
Thus, the world is not simply becoming multipolar 
in the sense that a fixed amount of power resources/ 
capabilities is distributed between more than two 
nation-states and, following this neorealist logic, only 
more countries compete for the leading role in inter-
national order. In fact, the horizontal complexity of 
the world firstly refers to a new diversity of actors 
that try to dominate the political discourse from very 
different angles (not only at the state level). Secondly, 
this new complexity is further expressed in a com-
petition of ideas/ideologies about international order 
and a multifaceted understanding of power. As Mouffe 
rightly emphasizes, “we should acknowledge that the 
world is a pluri-verse and realise that to accept a diver-
sity of political forms of organization will be more 
conducive to peace and stability than the enforcement 
of a universal model.”15 In this pluriverse competition, 
the notion of power is no longer understood as a mere 
distribution of capacities; the question “What is 
power?” is not as important as the question “What 
can power do?”16 
 
13  Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible 
Shift of Global Power to The East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008). 
14  Such as the unpredictable power of companies such as 
Google that, among others, has an interest in building cities 
in developing countries. See Mark Lutter, “Google’s Utopia: 
The Tech Giant Plans to Build Cities, Experiment with Social 
Rules”, Financial Review, 24 April 2015, http://www.afr.com/ 
technology/googles-utopia-the-tech-giant-plans-to-build-cities-
experiment-with-social-rules-20150421-1mpmlu (accessed 
31 August 2015).  
15  Chantal Mouffe, “Democracy in a Multipolar World”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37, no. 3 (2009): 554. 
16  Although “power identifies a capacity”, “power is a 
potentiality, not an actuality – indeed a potentiality that may 
never be actualized”; thus “having the means of power is not 
the same as being powerful”. Steven Lukes, “Power and the 
Battle of Hearts and Minds”, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 478. 
Everyday Practices in International Politics: 
Vertical Complexity of the World 
In addition to the horizontal complexity of the world 
– that is, the new range of actors and the new power 
dynamics that highlight a competition of ideas/ideol-
ogies about the future constitution of the international 
order – phenomena such as protest movements, trans-
national migration, jihadism (returnees), the flow of 
refugees, and the digitalization of society underscore 
the growing vertical challenges to the international 
order. These phenomena show that international poli-
tics is no longer limited to traditional inter-state rela-
tions in which the crucial container of “where politics 
take place” is still the Westphalian nation-state. More-
over, they jeopardize the boundaries between political 
levels (national, regional, and global) as well as the 
clear-cut distinction between domestic and foreign 
policy practices. Hence, these phenomena lay open 
alternative spaces and ways of political articulation 
that cut across the traditional layers of international 
politics. For instance, phenomena such as the various 
protest movements of the last years might have had 
an impact on the domestic policy of a third country or 
different movements might even have influenced each 
other. For a long time, international politics has been 
mainly about “the realm of exceptional events con-
ducted by states and statesmen, or their proxies.”17 
Today, international politics is increasingly driven by 
the concern of “the everyday,” in other words, events 
or phenomena that take place in the everyday environ-
ment of people. 
Consequently, we need to look beyond the well-
established but somewhat limited understanding of 
international politics to foster our “ability to concep-
tualize how the ‘international’ is constituted by and 
constituted of a myriad of phenomena.”18 This in-
cludes the viewpoint of the “international” as “every-
day practice” taking place in “everyday spaces.” Against 
this backdrop, it is necessary to understand how every-
day practices and spaces uncover the linkages between 
international politics and our everyday lives.19 
 
17  Xavier Guillaume, “The International As an Everyday Prac-
tice”, International Political Sociology 5, no. 4 (2011): 459. 
18  Xavier Guillaume, “Unveiling the ‘International’: Process, 
Identity and Alterity”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
35, no. 3 (2007): 742. 
19  See Matt Davies and Michael Niemann, “The Everyday 
Spaces of Global Politics: Work, Leisure, Family”, New Political 
Science 24, no. 4 (2002): 557–77. 
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This development is further increased by the digi-
talization of society. When something happens in the 
world, we (academics, policymakers, and public) rely 
on visual representations to believe it.20 Visuals are 
still “one of the principle ways in which news from 
distant places is brought home.”21 Images, photo-
graphs, and video clips further represent articulations 
of how people approach and engage with the world. 
Visual images, thus, are a means of mapping, watching, 
ordering, and representing the world.22 This, however, 
was also the case in the pre-digital world. The peculi-
arity in our digitalized world today is that visuals are 
usually available in an instant, since everyone with a 
smartphone can share them through services such 
as Facebook, Instagram, Tumblr, Twitter, YouTube, 
or WeChat. The fast pace of communication clearly 
diminishes the response time of policymakers. Thus, 
there is no time to wait when images – and along with 
them (often random) first statements, evaluations, or 
opinions – already surround you. It is something we 
learn from a friend of Mark Zuckerberg in the film 
“The Social Network”: The internet is not written in 
pencil but in ink. Consequently, it seems to be of ut-
most importance to be one of the first responders to 
influence a particular political debate, but at the same 
time, everything that is once said on the internet can-
not be taken back, or even deleted.23 Hence, the digi-
talization of society also questions the relationship 
between facts and truth, because when digitalized facts 
are being constantly updated, they lose their durabil-
ity, which once was the major characteristic of their 
truth.24 Furthermore, people all over the world are 
directly connected through social media. Together, 
they constitute a digital space of political communica-
tion that is detached from the traditional geographic 
 
20  After all, seeing is believing. See David Shim, Visual Politics 
and North Korea. Seeing is Believing (London: Routledge, 2014). 
21  David Campbell, “Poststructuralism”, in International Rela-
tions Theory. Discipline and Diversity, ed. by Tim Dunne, Milja 
Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 220. 
22  See David Shim and Dirk Nabers, “Imaging North Korea: 
Exploring Its Visual Representations in International Poli-
tics”, International Studies Perspectives 14, no. 3 (2013): 289–306. 
23  Which is very similar to what Dave Eggers emphasises in 
his novel “The Circle”, in which one of the pivotal principles 
of the company “the circle” is that “we don’t delete”. 
24  Mercedes Bunz, Die stille Revolution (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 
2012), 61. 
units of the world.25 Hence, this space again high-
lights the deterritorialization of politics (see horizon-
tal complexity of the world). 
For example, recent protests have been quickly 
visualized through photographs, video clips, and art 
work that were usually made by demonstrators them-
selves. Protest movements thus still rely on a geographic 
space or location, but protesters further create a vir-
tual space that detaches itself from territorial bounda-
ries (into rather new digital boundaries). Their images 
and videos create the paradox of being inside (that is, 
being part of the movement on the streets) as well as 
outside of the movement (since they also produce the 
“data of the movement”). This situation permeates the 
traditional categories of world politics. Consequently, 
protests in Egypt, Turkey, or Hong Kong are not only 
visible but also accessible for everyone in the world 
creating growing “imagined data communities.”26 
In other words, we have protest communities on the 
ground and growing data communities that facilitate 
the immediate production and transportation of news 
(in the form of visual imagery and others) from distant 
places to our home as well as to our national govern-
ments and policymakers. 
 
 
 
25  Still, the internet relies on physical and technical require-
ments. See Nicole Starosielski, The Undersea Network (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 2015). 
26  Nadav Hochmann, “The Social Media Image”, Big Data & 
Society (2014), 6. 
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China, the Menace! China, the Alternative? 
 
In Western academia and politics, it is particularly the 
narrative of China’s rise that questions the hegemony 
of Western powers (mainly the United States) in the 
international system. In the discipline of International 
Relations, this challenge is often described with the 
power transition theory. Power transition theory 
mainly deals with the (recurring) emergence of global 
power transformations and their effects on the struc-
ture of the international system. In this regard, power 
transition theory argues that the rise of China (and to 
a much lesser extent other non-Western powers) could 
lead to greater tension – even potential conflict – with 
the United States or the West in general. With regard 
to the future of US-China relations, John Ikenberry 
emphasizes, “the drama of China’s rise will feature an 
increasingly powerful China and a declining United 
States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leader-
ship of the international system.”27 China, it seems, is 
the pivotal menace of the existing international order. 
Why is this narrative still a rather dominant one? Sur-
prisingly, this is not only the case because of China’s 
(still) increasing power capabilities but rather because 
China is, in many ways, the “absolute other” to our 
understanding of international order. 
Firstly, China is a non-democracy, more precisely 
a “capitalist non-democracy” and, in this regard, the 
country is a denial of the liberal narrative that eco-
nomic development is necessarily followed by political 
democratization (in a Western sense). Secondly, China 
is one of the emerging actors forcing traditional powers 
(and institutions) to seriously consider what the coun-
try wants. Thirdly, China also has to deal with new 
phenomena that challenge the national coherence 
and stability of the country and does this on its own 
terms. Hence, President Xi Jinping has explicitly in-
creased the control and surveillance system within 
China, particularly in questions regarding the digital-
ization of society.28 
 
27  John G. Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of 
the West. Can the Liberal System Survive?”, Foreign Affairs 
(2008), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/ 
rise-china-and-future-west (accessed 31 August 2008). 
28  The Chinese leadership plans a comprehensive package 
of security-related laws. In July 2015, a new National Security 
Law was already adopted by the National People’s Congress 
What in recent years has mainly happened in our 
dealings with China is that we have created a political 
narrative of “us” on this side and “them” on the other 
side. In other words, we tend to clearly differentiate 
“us” – our political system, political practices, think-
ing, and values – from “them.” Consequently, our 
academic and political debates about the likelihood of 
China rising peacefully, the country’s potential threat 
to the international order, or the new assertiveness 
in its foreign policy practices somehow constitute the 
image of “a” China that acts outside of what we – in 
the West – regard as the righteous way of politics in the 
first place. This is not unusual, since every political 
and collective identity is based on the process of differ-
entiation between an “us” and a “them.” The distinc-
tion of who belongs to us and who does not is, thus, 
not accidental – it is a precondition of community.29 
However, as Mouffe rightly claims, “it means that 
there is always the possibility of this relation us/them 
becoming one of friend/enemy.”30 If we mark China as 
the menace, and even harsher as the enemy, it always 
includes the “real possibility of physical killing.”31 
Nevertheless, it is not an imperative that the differen-
tiation of “us” and “them” has to turn out this way. 
The task is to think of others not as enemies but adver-
saries, which, for Mouffe, are “friendly enemies, that 
is, persons who are friends because they share a com-
mon symbolic space but also enemies because they 
want to organize this common symbolic space in a 
different way.”32 Hence, the crucial questions are how 
China wants to organize the common space of inter-
national politics and whether the Chinese leadership 
uses the growing leverage to push forward an alter-
native Chinese understanding of (international) order. 
 
and at the end of December 2015 an anti-terrorism law 
passed. However, a cyber-security law and an NGO-law are 
also currently being drafted and debated.  
29  Following Carl Schmitt’s classic Concept of the Political, 
the identification of a necessary outsider constitutes politi-
cal groups and also helps to differentiate among them. 
30  Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (see note 7), 550. 
31  Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 33. 
32  Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (see note 7), 13. 
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In approaching these issues, it is crucial to under-
stand that the notion of international order is not 
much discussed in China’s departments of Inter-
national Relations. Rather, the meaning of political 
order is dealt with in other disciplinary contexts such 
as Linguistics, History, Philosophy, and Sociology. Chi-
nese International Relations departments are mostly 
constituted by people who studied – and sometimes 
even translated – the most important Western Inter-
national Relations texts into Chinese.33 In addition, 
their scholarly points of departure – and this is par-
ticularly the case for most Chinese International Rela-
tions experts – are still the “very ideas that are the 
root of the modern Western worldview.”34 I focus in-
stead on brief illustrations of China’s traditional under-
standing of order, the idea of Chinese networks, and 
Zhao Tingyang’s political philosophy35 because all 
 
33  What you can find in these departments are scholars who 
try to bridge local traditions and perspectives with key Inter-
ational Relations concepts and categories. For example, the 
work of Qin Yaqing, who points us to the importance of back-
ground knowledge (culture, experience, habits, histories, etc.) 
in the respective communities. Qin particularly introduces a 
constructivist perspective that builds on the idea of relation-
alism, which represents a central aspect in traditional Chi-
nese thinking. See Qin Yaqing, “International Society As a 
Process: Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise”, 
The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 129–53. Thus, 
he promotes a specific Chinese perspective on constructivism 
without “advocating a Chinese school per se”. Arlene B. Tickner 
and David L. Blaney, Claiming the International (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2013), 19. Qin and others have written 
extensively on this. See Song Xinning, “Building International 
Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics”, Journal of Con-
temporary China 10, no. 26 (2001): 61–74, and Zhongguo guoji-
guanxi yanjiu (1995–2005) [Chinese IR Scholarship, 1995–2005], 
ed. Jisi Wang et al. (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2006). 
34  Tickner and Blaney, Claiming the International (see note 33), 
3. They cannot think out of the box because they are educated 
in the box. 
35  Zhao Tingyang has been increasingly noticed in the West, 
especially since he has also published in English. During a 
research trip from August to December 2010 in Beijing, I met 
with Professor Zhao personally and at different conferences 
in Beijing and Xiamen. In the Beijing academic circle, par-
ticularly within Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 
Zhao is very well-known and respected, although his concep-
tion of tianxia has also created a broad debate among Chinese 
academics, especially historians and philosophers. Regarding 
the issue of tianxia (all under heaven), Zhao has published two 
books, many Chinese articles, and two English articles. See 
Zhao Tingyang, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept 
‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tian-xia)”, Social Identities 12, no. 1 (2006): 
29–41; Zhao Tingyang, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms 
of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia)”, Diogenes 56, no. 5 (2009): 5–18. 
In the chapter on Zhao Tingyang’s philosophy, I mainly refer 
highlight elements of Chinese political practice that 
might also be helpful to understand the main charac-
teristics of Xi Jinping’s OBOR initiative. 
Traditional Chinese Understanding of 
“Order”: Tianxia and Chaogong Tixi36 
The ideas of tianxia (all under heaven) and chaogong tixi 
(tributary system) derive from the early Zhou Dynasty 
(ca. 1100–256 B.C.) and have accompanied Chinese 
politicians, philosophers, and thinkers ever since. Con-
sequently, there does not exist one definition of tianxia 
or chaogong tixi but many interpretations. Following 
John J. Fairbank’s famous attempt to identify the 
essence of the Chinese World Order, I only highlight 
key characteristics of both concepts. 
The notion of tianxia constitutes the core of the Chi-
nese traditional concept of political order. As Edward 
Wang points out, “Zhongguo [the Middle Kingdom, 
China, N. G.] indicated the center of the world, hence 
the ‘central state’ or ‘middle kingdom’, while Tianxia 
referred to the extended Chinese world, despite its 
ecumenical claim.”37 From a Chinese perspective, 
tianxia comprises the whole known geographic space. 
Furthermore, “the Confucian conception of tianxia 
refers to an ideal moral and political order admitting 
of no territorial boundary – the whole world to be 
governed by a sage according to principles of rites (li) 
and virtues (de).”38 This sage stands for the Chinese 
Emperor, who is appointed by heaven (tian). He holds 
the Mandate of Heaven (tianming), which legitimizes 
his authority. Thus, the Emperor is the Son of Heaven 
(tianzi) and he likewise represents the highest level 
of morality. His authority essentially depends on this 
virtue and his ability to act in the terms of the Man-
date of Heaven. Ideally, the Emperor rules and attracts 
 
to Zhao Tingyang, Politics of Everybody [Mei ge ren de Zhengzhi] 
(Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2010), and chap-
ter 4 of Zhao Tingyang, Investigations of the Bad World: Political 
Philosophy as First Philosophy [Huai Shijie Yanjiu: Zuowei diyi zhexue 
de zhengzhi zhexue] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmindaxue Chuban-
she, 2009). 
36  These paragraphs are partly taken from Nadine Gode-
hardt, “China and the Definition of the Asian Region”, in 
Regional Powers and Regional Order, ed. by Nadine Godehardt 
and Dirk Nabers (New York: Routledge, 2011), 119–21. 
37  Edward Wang, “History, Space, and Ethnicity: The Chinese 
Worldview”, Journal of World History 10, no 2. (1999): 287. 
38  Joseph Chan, “Territorial Boundaries and Confucianism”, 
in Confucian-Political Ethics, ed. Daniel A. Bell (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 69. 
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all under heaven (tianxia), because “if people under 
your reign are happy, people will be attracted to come 
from afar.”39 In this sense, his authority surpasses ter-
ritorial boundaries and his moral superiority is simul-
taneously a prerequisite for his selection, the ground-
ing of his authority, and also serves as the leading 
principle for his actions. Put differently, the Emperor’s 
morality (personality) cannot be distinguished from 
his authority (office). Herrlee G. Creel explicitly em-
phasizes the centrality of tianxia for traditional China: 
“The doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven became the 
cornerstone of the Chinese empire. Henceforward 
China was a state – and, since it ideally embraced ‘all 
under heaven’, the only state – created by, and main-
tained under the direct supervision of, the highest 
deity, Heaven. Its ruler was the Son of Heaven. His office 
bestowed the highest lorry [sic!] possible to man.”40 
The Emperor exemplifies the core of the Chinese 
empire. His authority is not constrained by territorial 
boundaries. Consequently, foreign relations in the 
tianxia are rather a reflection of internal relations. As 
Fairbank underscores, the “Chinese tended to think of 
their foreign relations as giving expression externally 
to the same principle of social and political order that 
were manifested internally within the Chinese state 
and society.”41 Instead of territorial boundaries, rela-
tions between different entities are better expressed by 
a hierarchical relationship between the center (Emper-
or) and the periphery (tributary states). In this regard, 
Edward Wang rightly argues that “in the Chinese per-
ception of the world, there was always a center-periph-
ery consideration that helped situate the zhongguo in 
the known world, the Tianxia.”42 The Chinese under-
standing of hierarchy, therefore, stands for a specific 
distribution of power, that is, the acceptance of the 
largest power by independent sovereign states (or 
kingdoms) that remain fully functional on their own 
terms.43 
 
39  Confucius, Analects of Confucius (Beijing: Beijing Foreign 
Languages Printing House, 1994), 13, 16. 
40  Herrlee G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China, vol. 1: 
The Western Chou Empire (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1970), 93. 
41  John K. Fairbank, The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s 
Foreign Relations, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1968), 3. 
42  Wang, “History, Space, and Ethnicity: The Chinese World-
view” (see note 37), 290. 
43  David Kang, “The Theoretical Roots of Hierarchy in Inter-
national Relations”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 58 
(2004): 348. Kang further describes this as a feature of Asian 
international relations. He emphasises that, in contrast to the 
The tributary system (chaogong tixi), therefore, organ-
ized and structured the co-existence between the dif-
ferent entities in the Chinese tianxia system. However, 
the tribute system was not only one-sided; it was based 
on a mutual exchange of payments that – especially 
in periods of weakness – were more expensive for the 
Chinese Emperor than the tributaries.44 
It is further interesting that foreign kingdoms 
could only establish contact with the Chinese empire 
by following the rules of the tributary system. After 
all, the Chinese empire was the only accepted political 
order. In fact, the existence of other political orders 
would have been contrary to the very idea of the tianxia 
system – at least following Chinese logic. Peripheral 
countries were perceived rather as being either vassal 
states or barbarians that lacked the cultural prerequi-
sites to establish an independent and sovereign politi-
cal order. Nevertheless, each of these units still kept a 
certain amount of self-determination and autonomy. 
But the implementation of sovereign policies would 
have been equated with an internal rebellion against 
the authority of the Chinese Emperor that could jus-
tify a punitive expedition. As Zhao emphasizes: “The 
hegemonic nature of Chinese culture in the region 
gave rise to a false security among the Chinese em-
perors that world hierarchy was universal. There were 
no other hierarchies and no other sources of power 
on the international scene. […] In modern parlance, 
one might say that all states were ‘satellites’ of China. 
Within the satellites, a great deal of ‘self-determina-
tion’ existed, but opposition to China was considered 
rebellion against the established order and the tradi-
tional values, and should be dealt with accordingly.”45 
 
European tradition, which was dominated by formal equality 
and informal hierarchy, the Asian (particularly Chinese) tra-
ditions highlights formal hierarchy and informal equality 
(Kang 2006, 339–40). 
44  See Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast 
Asia: A Background Essay”, in The Chinese World Order: Traditional 
China’s Foreign Relations, ed. by John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). With regards to the long 
history of Chinese dynasties, the margin between claim and 
actuality concerning the idea of superiority were often enough 
impossible to bridge. 
45  Zhao Suisheng, Power Competition in East Asia: From the Old 
Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 19. 
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Chinese Networks or the Differential Mode of Association  
(Chaxu Geju) 
Fei Xiaotong introduces the concept of chaxu geju, 
which he regards as central to understand China’s 
traditional social order.a This concept is charac-
terized by a pattern of circles surrounding a core.b 
Fei compares this pattern with “the circles that ap-
pear on the surface of a lake when a rock is thrown 
into it.”c Although each person is at the center of 
his/her own network (egocentrism), all networks 
are interrelated. In contrast to the Western mode 
of association, which, following Fei, presumes 
the autonomy of individuals and consists of clear 
boundaries between self and others (inside/out-
side, subject/object, public/private, etc.), the Chi-
nese mode of association builds on “overlapping 
networks of people linked together through dif-
ferentially categorized social relationships.”d 
This again underscores that there are no clear-cut 
boundaries between different networks. A person 
is part of strong as well as weak relationships, 
with very different demands and duties in each  
 
 specific context. The relevance of other people 
depends on their position within the concentric 
circles of one’s own network. People do not need to 
decide between networks, for instance because of 
differing interests. Networks can exist in parallel. 
Hence, the traditional Chinese social order is based 
on flexible networks without clear boundaries. 
“This is a society in which considerations of order, 
not laws, predominate; and in this context, order 
means […] that each person must uphold the moral 
obligations of his or her network ties. Otherwise, 
the entire social system collapses.”e 
Fei’s differential mode of association (chaxu geju) 
is an important point of reference for the following 
discussion. Although it should only be applied care-
fully to modern Chinese society and politics, it, how-
ever, highlights that the Chinese concept of net-
work might help us to understand the main features 
of the new OBOR initiative.f 
a  See Fei Xiaotong, From the Soil. The Foundations of Chinese 
Society (Berkeley et al.: University of California Press, 1992). 
Fei Xiaotong was the first social scientist that introduced 
“features of the Chinese social network with the concept of 
differential order, as illustrates by the concentric circles”. 
Hwang Kawang-Kuo, “Chinese Relationalism: Theoretical 
Construction and Methodological Considerations”, Journal 
of the Theory of Social Behaviour 30, no. 2 (2000): 136. 
b  Fei, From the Soil, ibid., 60–71. 
c  Ibid., 62. 
d  Hamilton and Zheng, “Introduction”, in ibid., 20. 
 e  Ibid., 24. 
f  Furthermore, it again becomes apparent that most of the 
important Western political concepts such as community, 
legitimacy, sovereignty, or even the idea of the Westphalian 
nation-state, which we also use in our analyses about Modern 
China, have no roots in Chinese culture and traditional 
thinking after all. 
 
 
Revival of Tianxia: 
Zhao Tingyang’s Political Philosophy 
In his work on rethinking tianxia, Zhao Tingyang 
develops the traditional Chinese idea of tianxia into a 
contemporary political theory – a theory of “world-
ness.”46 Zhao introduces his own tianxia ideal-type of 
the world. He is not so much interested in the philo-
sophical debates about the evolution of tianxia in 
 
46  See Zhao Tingyang, Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun 
[The Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of a World 
Institution] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2005); Zhao, 
Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35); Zhang Feng, “The 
Tianxia System: World Order in a Chinese Utopia”, Global Asia. 
A Journal of the East Asia Foundation 4, no. 4 (2009): 108–12. 
Chinese thinking. Zhao rather extracts and perspec-
tivizes. As Callahan rightly points out, he aims to 
“‘transcend the historical limits’ of Chinese tradi-
tion.”47 With reference to one of the most ancient 
notions of Chinese philosophy, Zhao constitutes a 
Chinese picture, theory, and view of the world.48 
In Politics of Everybody, Zhao unfolds his ontological 
assumptions, which are essential to his work on 
 
47  William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: 
Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?”, International Studies 
Review 10 (2008): 753. 
48  I focus particularly on Zhao’s argumentation, without 
all his many (often too narrowly considered) comparisons to 
“Western approaches”, since I rather aim to highlight the 
particular strengths of his approach. 
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rethinking tianxia.49 He argues that humans do not 
exist independently from each other. They are always 
placed in the world and, thus, are always acting in 
relation to others, which is why the world is not simply 
a “world of things,” that is, a world of autonomous 
objects.50 According to Zhao, people cannot live in 
isolation because from the moment they exist they 
act, and when they act they always do so in relation 
to others.51 Consequently, Zhao strongly underlines 
an “ontology of coexistence” (gongzai zunzailun) instead 
of an ontology of things (or an ontology of existence). 
Hence, there is nothing outside of coexistence, which 
emphasizes the point that coexistence comes even 
before existence.52 In Western thinking, Zhao’s idea 
could be best described in the words of the French 
philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy.53 In his essay “Being Sin-
gular Plural,” he emphasizes that there is no existence 
without coexistence, since I always relate myself to 
others and others are only in relation to me.54 “That 
which exists, whatever this might be, coexists because 
it exists. […] the world is the coexistence that put these 
existences together.”55 Thus, “I” cannot come before, 
and, furthermore, cannot be independent of “we.” 
As Nancy points out, “From the very beginning, then, 
‘we’ are with one another, not as points gathered to-
gether, or as a togetherness that is divided up, but as 
a being-with-one-another.”56 In a similar way, Zhao 
emphasizes that people are embedded in the world 
and that they always exist in relation to others. They 
live in plurality, together with each other, and only 
because they do, it gives meaning to their existence.57 
Zhao’s understanding of world thus refers to a world 
of coexistence and relationality.58 
Following Zhao, the key to understanding the po-
litical problems of our world lies in seeing the world 
as a “failed world.”59 He understands the contempo-
 
49  Zhao, Politics of Everybody (see note 35). 
50  Ibid., 163. 
51  Ibid., 167. 
52  Ibid., 172. 
53  See Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2000). 
54  Thus, “Being is singularly plural and plurally singular”, 
Nancy, Being Singular Plural (see note 53), 28. 
55  Ibid., 29. 
56  Ibid., 96. 
57  For instance through the type and contexts of their rela-
tionship. 
58  His focus is primarily on the relations between A and B. 
59  Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-
heaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 6. 
rary world as a “non-world,”60 since we have not yet 
developed a political worldview that has constituted 
an effective political world order, world institution, 
or simply a world entity. He states that “the failure to 
create a world entity is basically due to political igno-
rance of the idea of mundus qua mundus, a lack of politi-
cal philosophy from the viewpoint of the world as a 
whole, as opposed to that of nation-states.”61 In his 
view, Western approaches “lack a vision of world-ness,” 
whereas Chinese theory understands the “world from 
its world-ness.”62 This is not to be mistaken as a plea 
for a “holistic approach”; Zhao rather points us to an 
alternative starting point of thinking. Here, the world 
is comprised of interrelated and co-existing entities. 
The understanding of the “world from its world-ness,” 
thus, refers to a perspective that always looks at the 
whole picture and not only parts of it (for example, 
individual entities such as nation-states). 
In his discussion about the notion of tianxia, he 
stresses three components.63 First, tianxia refers to 
the topographical expanse, everything under the sky, 
or simply the geographical world. Therefore, the first 
meaning gives reference to the geography of the world. 
Second, the social understanding of tianxia refers to 
the necessary support of the “hearts of all people” 
(minxin). Minxin secures the political legitimacy of the 
tianxia and mostly depends on virtuous governance. 
Therefore, the relationship between the common 
agreement of the people (minxin) and the rule of virtue 
(dezhi) is co-constitutive.64 Third, the most important 
meaning of tianxia is the establishment of a world in-
stitution (shijie zhixu65), and only with the creation of 
such a world institution will the tianxia system be fully 
accomplished. Consequently, Zhao’s conception of 
tianxia represents an understanding of the world as 
a material geographic entity, a social collective sup-
ported by all people, and a world order. Zhao particular-
ly emphasizes that the world is not simply an autono-
mous object; rather, the world only becomes our world 
when we – all people in coexistence – build a world in-
stitution.66 
 
60  Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35). 
61  Ibid., 6. 
62  Zhao, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-
under-heaven’ (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 31. 
63  Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-
heaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 9–10. 
64  Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 98. 
65  The Chinese word zhixu can also be translated as “order” 
66  Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-
heaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 9. 
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Alongside these three relatively broad meanings, 
Zhao mentions a set of important principles that 
further explain the features of the tianxia system. 
The first is the principle of “all-inclusiveness” (wuwai), 
which states that every person, family, or state is part 
of tianxia. Nothing is considered to be outside, since 
we are all embedded in the world anyway. Nobody is 
excluded. Tianxia becomes the common interest of 
every person; this interest is in line with the many 
existing personal interests because of the underlying 
conformity of both.67 Thus, the “inclusion of all” de-
scribes the world as a family of – and a home to – all 
people. As Zhao emphasizes, “‘all-under-heaven’ is 
meant to be of all and for all, and never of and for 
anybody in particular.”68 The condition of wuwai also 
secures peace and prosperity among the countries 
in the tianxia; it refers to the transformation of many 
states into one world entity by attraction rather than 
coercion.69 World Order prevents conflict and chaos 
and “should be as extensive as possible, thereby con-
tributing to a worldwide political system in which all 
are included and protected, and in which nobody is 
treated as an outsider.”70 
In a tianxia system, in which every place is internal, 
Zhao characterizes relations between different entities 
as relations between the close and the distant (yuanjin 
qinshu guanxi). Zhao refers to what is generally described 
with the image of core-periphery relations that origi-
nally indicated the difference between the core and 
the periphery in cultural and geographic terms. Later, 
this image often changed into an idea of discrimina-
tion of the core toward the periphery, or simply a pre-
supposed supremacy of the core toward the periph-
ery.71 However, it is crucial that the relation between 
the close and the distant is not understood in a purely 
geographic sense. Closeness and distance can also be 
perceived in cultural terms; thus, the “core” could also 
be identified as a mutual understanding of certain 
values or ideas independent from the geographic loca-
tion. The development of these relationships is a pro-
cess of constant change and transformation. Conse-
quently, “all-inclusiveness” does not simply stand for 
enforced conformity. 
 
67  Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 90. 
68  Ibid., 11. 
69  William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order” 
(see note 47), 752. 
70  Ibid., 752. 
71  Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-
heaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 92. 
The second principle deals with the institutional 
character of the tianxia, specifically the issues of order 
(zhi) and disorder (luan). Zhi represents the Chinese 
quest to establish a good social order that is accepted 
by the people; on the other hand, luan stands for the 
absence of any social order.72 A successfully consti-
tuted zhi comprises institutions that are credible and, 
thus, foster social trust. In addition, the institutions 
should facilitate cooperation and keep the possibility 
of conflict low. Zhao further argues that “maximizing 
cooperation is even more important than minimizing 
conflict, since the former contains the latter, but the 
latter does not contain the former.”73 In addition, 
cooperation in the tianxia is based on two political 
strategies. First, the strategy of virtue (de celüe), which, 
from a long-term perspective, seems to be more effec-
tive than the use of force, since it builds mainly on the 
common agreement of all people (minxin). This strategy 
essentially refers to the differentiation between the 
people, who get more benefits, and the sovereign, who 
then obtains the power to rule.74 Second, Zhao intro-
duces the strategy of harmony (he celüe), which focuses 
on the question of how to build cooperation out of dif-
fering interests. Cooperation is here inevitably linked 
to harmony. Harmony (he) is seen as the most essential 
principle in Chinese thinking: “the necessary onto-
logical condition for different things to exist and 
develop.”75 In contrast to the idea of sameness (tong), 
harmony refers to the diversity of things that make 
cooperation possible. It follows that harmony grows 
out of the improvement and transformation of dif-
ferences, whereas “sameness reduce[s] possibilities to 
only one thing.”76 Hence, harmony (he) represents an 
ontological principle, whereas sameness (tong) stands 
for a psychological effect (in other words, all simply 
merge into one). The two should not be confused.77 
This distinction is crucial because harmony is contrary 
to sameness, in that it does not refer to an enforced 
conformity that would destroy the substance of cul-
ture in the first place. Culture develops – and is shaped 
 
72  Ibid. 
73  Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 106 
(transl. N. G.). 
74  Ibid., 114. 
75  Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-
heaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 14; Zhao, Investigations of the 
Bad World (see note 35), 117. 
76  Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-
heaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 14. 
77  Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 118. 
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by – relations within the tianxia.78 The concept of 
harmony again reveals the underlying ontology of 
Zhao’s theory. In this regard, Zhao points out three 
criteria. First, “relations determine things.”79 
Therefore, defining a thing as such cannot determine 
its ontological condition or its very existence. A thing 
can only be defined in relation to other things.80 
Second, the harmonious relationship between things 
is the necessary condition for the survival of things. 
“Coexistence is, therefore, the precondition for 
existence.”81 Third, the mutual relationship between 
people also facilitates conditions whereby everybody 
benefits from these relations. According to Zhao, this 
principle highlights the differences between harmony 
and cooperation, since “the principle of cooperation 
could be seen as being ‘live-and-let-live,’ whereas 
harmony is a stronger principle meaning live-if-let-live 
and improve-if-let-improve.”82 Ideally, harmony thus 
creates a game where common success is inevitably 
linked to the reciprocal relationship between actors. 
A can only gain benefits if B also benefits, and vice 
versa.83 Harmony is in fact the premise on which a 
successful world institution should be established. In 
summary, Zhao develops a specific perspective of the 
world by highlighting the ontology of coexistence, the 
need for cooperation and harmony, and the embed-
dedness and relationality of all actors. In this sense, 
he reframes the notion of tianxia as a way to highlight 
a Chinese philosophical concept of political (and inter-
national) order. 
 
78  It also refers to Qin Yaqing’s understanding of Chinese 
dialectics, where A and non-A, in the process of exchange 
between A and non-A, are constantly redefining their iden-
tities. See Qin Yaqing, “International Society As a Process: 
Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise”, The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 129–153; Qin Yaqing, 
“Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and 
China’s International Stategy”, The Chinese Journal of Inter-
national Politics 7, no 3. (2014): 285–314. 
79  Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 118 
(tranls. N. G.). 
80  Ibid.; Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of 
All-under-heaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 15. 
81  Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 118 
(transl N.G). 
82  The idea of live-and-let-live refers to a rather pure “exist-
ence”, in other words “I live and let you live”. Harmony, how-
ever, puts everyone in a conditional relationship to each other 
or “coexistence”, that is “I live if I let you live, and I improve 
if I let you improve”. Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in 
Terms of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 15. 
83  Zhao also calls his harmonious strategy “Confucian im-
provement” (kongzi gaijin). 
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The Chinese OBOR Initiative: 
An Alternative Concept of International Order? 
 
In early September 2013 President Xi Jinping first 
announced the “Silk Road Economic Belt” as an eco-
nomic initiative to deepen cooperation and expand 
development in the Eurasian region.84 A month later, 
Xi visited Indonesia and prominently introduced the 
“21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” which comple-
ments the Silk Road Economic Belt and is supposed 
to link China across the Indian Ocean and Africa to 
Europe. Although the Chinese Silk Road initiatives, 
now officially the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, 
were, particularly at the beginning, very vague in con-
tent, they are not simply just a hasty manifestation 
of another Silk Road image.85 In fact, since Xi’s speech 
in Kazakhstan, the “One Belt, One Road” phrase has 
quickly penetrated the Chinese academic, political, 
and public discourse. It is, thus, repeatedly mentioned 
in all possible contexts. In a very short time, the Silk 
Road initiatives grew into a dominant representation 
for China’s foreign policy practices, regional neigh-
borhood relations, as well as some domestic issues, 
especially regarding China’s economic development. 
Interestingly, it has never been defined officially what 
the OBOR initiative geographically actually comprises. 
All maps that have been published either by Chinese 
or other sources only present interpretations of offi-
cial statements or documents. Most maps do not even 
show national borders, but rather various corridors, 
regions, and cities.86 
 
84  For more information about the initial Chinese discourse 
about the Silk Road initiatives, see  Nadine Godehardt, Chinas 
“neue” Seidenstraßeninitiative. Regionale Nachbarschaft als Kern der 
chinesischen Außenpolitik unter Xi Jinping, SWP-Studie 9/2014 (Ber-
lin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2014). 
85  The image of the Silk Road has been used quite extensive-
ly in international politics, not only with regard to foreign 
policies of many different nation-states (examples, Central 
Asian states, Turkey, etc.), the US-led New Silk Road strategy 
concerning the future of Afghanistan, and several Eurasian 
land-bridge projects (transport projects). It has also been used 
in China’s past, in particular to describe China’s infrastruc-
ture policy towards the Western regions. Thus, even in the 
Chinese political discourse, the idea of the Silk Road is not 
completely new; however, it was never successfully imple-
mented as a comprehensive policy tying China’s foreign 
(neighboring) and domestic policy closer together.  
86  I am thankful to Maximilian Mayer for highlighting this 
aspect to me. 
This repetition of an (at first) “empty political 
phrase” is, however, in many ways characteristic of 
the introduction of new Chinese (domestic or foreign) 
policies. Other examples are, for instance, concepts 
such as “harmonious society/world” and “peaceful 
development.” In this context, the reference to the 
ancient trade route of the Silk Road is similarly diffi-
cult to classify. The Chinese leadership usually intends 
to provide as little concrete information as possible 
about what these political labels actually mean when 
they are firstly announced.87 This vagueness, however, 
often creates space for vivid debates in academia, 
the media, or, generally, in the public. Most concepts 
initially only offer starting points for discussion; they 
are not yet comprehensive and well-thought-through 
political programs. In fact, these concepts depend on 
the work of scholars, experts, or policymakers who 
develop concrete ideas of implementation and try to 
further flesh out the contents of these political labels. 
Consequently, the Chinese leadership has encour-
aged think tanks, research institutes, and different 
governmental branches88 as well as provincial govern-
ments to host international workshops and confer-
ences to stimulate the debate. In the case of the OBOR 
initiative, there has been a tremendous demand for 
discussion. Since Xi’s speech in Kazakhstan in Septem-
ber 2013, already dozens of Silk Road events have been 
organized all over China, several specific OBOR research 
institutes were founded, and in late March 2015, the 
government even set up a “special leading group” that 
oversees the coordination and implementation of dif-
ferent projects under the framework of the OBOR ini-
tiative.89 
 
87  As William Callahan has also prominently shown in 
his analysis about Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”. William A. 
Callahan, China Dreams: 20 Visions of the Future (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
88  Most likely, all branches under the management of the 
State Council, and regarding the OBOR, also the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in particular. 
89  For example: China’s OBOR Strategic Research Institute 
at the Beijing International Studies University, http://obor. 
bisu.edu.cn/, or the OBOR Research Institute at the China 
Institute of International Studies at Beijing, http://www.ciis. 
org.cn/chinese/node_544601.htm. See also, “China Sets Up 
Leading Team on Belt and Road Initiative”, Xinhuanet Online, 
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After the announcement of the new Silk Road ini-
tiatives, the reactions of Chinese experts were initially 
rather cautious and general. They either emphasized 
the geopolitical (in contrast to US efforts) or trans-
regional significance of the OBOR initiative. This em-
phasis has changed slightly since mid 2014. The many 
Silk Road forums as well as the number of newly setup 
research projects show two further developments. 
Firstly, most forums were organized in different Chi-
nese provinces, thus many local cadre also partici-
pated. Their involvement clearly added a stronger 
domestic and socio-economic dimension to the Silk 
Road initiatives. Secondly, the often very diverse com-
position of participants also led to vastly differing 
ideas of potential areas of cooperation for the coun-
tries along the Silk Road. However, it became clear 
that the OBOR is not only about traditional infrastruc-
ture programs (although this is still a major aspect), 
but should also, for instance, include environmental 
issues, questions of urbanization, and the build-up of 
partnerships between key cities along the Silk Road. 
The recently published official report Vision and 
Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road absorbed many of these ideas 
that have been discussed between scholars, experts, 
local cadres, journalists, and entrepreneurs.90 How-
ever, the authors of the report also seem to have in-
cluded every suggestion that was mentioned between 
September 2013 and March 2015. After a careful look 
at the report, it seems the vagueness of Xi’s speech was 
replaced with a listing of “everything” that was men-
tioned at different occasions, turning OBOR into one 
of the most ambitious political visions of the last years. 
Striking are three aspects of the report. Firstly, the 
authors quite prominently emphasize the inclusive-
ness of the initiative and the chance to create win-win 
cooperation that is beneficial to all participating 
countries along the Silk Road.91 The major goal is to 
strengthen connectivity (hulian hutong) by building up 
traditional infrastructure and establishing a network 
 
29 March 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-
03/29/c_134107435.htm (accessed 1 September 2015). 
90  Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt 
and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, issued by the NDRC, Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the 
People’s Republic of China with State Council authorization 
(March 2015), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/ 
t20150330_669367.html (accessed 1 September 2015). 
91  “Inclusiveness” (Baorongxing) is repeatedly used by Xi 
Jinping. On every official occasion, he refers to the inclusive-
ness of China’s new initiatives – not only referring to the Silk 
Roads but also BRICS development bank and AIIB. 
of key cities. These parts often read like a revival of 
China’s Great Western Development Strategy, only 
that this time the focus is on the development of 
regions outside of China.92 
Secondly, the authors emphasize the close relation 
between the OBOR and different economic corridors 
such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the 
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor. 
Furthermore, they refer to many recently announced 
financial institutions, such as the AIIB, the New Devel-
opment Bank (formerly known as BRICS Development 
Bank), and the Silk Road Fund as parts of the OBOR 
initiative. In this regard, they also mention the Chi-
nese intention to follow up on negotiations about an 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Development 
Bank. This, moreover, underscores the Chinese willing-
ness to build up a strong financial backing for OBOR 
mainly through multilateral investment banks or 
funds, but also through the support of domestic finan-
cial institutions such as the Export-Import Bank or the 
China Development Bank.93 Thirdly, OBOR also has a 
domestic and socio-economic dimension, in particular 
regarding the increasing focus on China’s borderland 
regions. In other words, the report identifies key prov-
inces, such as Xinjiang, Fujian, Guangxi, and Yunnan, 
that should strengthen cooperation with their neigh-
boring countries. This is not a new element of Chinese 
politics, but it is clearly new that all these different 
areas of Chinese politics (domestic, foreign, regional, 
etc.) are now set under the framework of the OBOR 
initiative. 
Key Features of China’s OBOR Initiative 
The OBOR initiative is not (yet) a “grand strategy” 
that presents itself as a counter-model to all estab-
lished mechanisms, rules, and values characterizing 
the existing international order. Thinking in an 
either/or manner is not very helpful at this juncture, 
since it conceals that the constitution of a counter-
narrative is nothing that the Chinese can simply pull 
out of the hat. Besides, China also is part of the exist-
ing international system, incorporated in global net-
 
92  Great Western Development Strategy is a plan of the Chi-
nese leadership to develop the Western part of China, particu-
larly through building up infrastructure. It started in the 
year 2000. 
93  The fact that the report was also published by the NDRC 
shows that the OBOR has a clear internal dimension, particu-
larly regarding China’s borderland provinces. 
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works, and – regarding building up the OBOR – also 
dependent on a stable international order. Never-
theless, OBOR can be regarded as a proactive Chinese 
response to the growing complexity in the world that 
definitely has the potential to turn into an alternative 
concept of how international politics could be organ-
ized in the future. It represents a loose political con-
cept in which new mechanisms of cooperation are 
created, or already existing institutions and ongoing 
projects are integrated.94 In this regard, OBOR is in 
fact very different from our rule-based Eurocentric 
model of international order. 
Firstly, the OBOR initiative is mainly about building 
up and strengthening cooperation among the countries 
along the Silk Road. The goal is to create networks of 
cooperation in many areas and on many different po-
litical levels. The guiding principle echoes Zhao Ting-
yang’s abovementioned description of a successful 
order in which “maximizing cooperation is even more 
important than minimizing conflict, since the former 
contains the latter, but the latter does not contain the 
former.”95 This also reflects the Chinese debate about 
OBOR, which focuses mainly on common benefits and 
economic opportunities, but less on security threats 
and difficulties.96 It also points us again to the rather 
simple Chinese understanding of stability, which 
refers to the absence of chaos. 
Secondly, the OBOR initiative is flexible, inclusive, and 
open. The geographic scope of the initiative is, thus, 
not determined and remains vague. As highlighted in 
the official report of March 2015, OBOR is increasingly 
perceived as being beneficial for people and countries 
around the world.97 The aspect that the Chinese leader-
ship still has not published an official OBOR map fur-
 
94  At the simultaneous Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
and BRICS summits in July 2015, even the Russian initiative 
of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was linked to – and 
actually even integrated in – the OBOR initiative. From the 
Chinese perspective, this is not a contradiction, it rather rep-
resents the very idea of inclusiveness that marks the Chinese 
initiative. 
95  Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 106. 
96  This does not mean that Chinese experts and policymakers 
are not aware of the security issues, but it is not the main nar-
rative regarding the OBOR initiative. 
97  As General Qiao Lang emphasised in a speech at the Uni-
versity of Defense: “As a rising great power, ‘one belt, one 
road’ is the initial stage of China globalization. As a big coun-
try, the process of rising must be about the plan for advancing 
globalization.” Qiao Liang, “One Belt, One Road”, Eurasian 
Review of Geopolitics, 17 July 2015, http://temi.repubblica.it/ 
limes-heartland/one-belt-one-road/2070 (accessed 1 September 
2015). 
ther underscores its “global” openness and inclusive-
ness. Every country that has an interest in the Silk 
Road or in one of the institutions related to the OBOR 
initiative can become part of it.98 Despite this 
inclusive orientation, the success of the OBOR and its 
related institutions also relies on the diversity of the 
countries along the Silk Road. Following Zhao 
Tingyang’s argumentation, inclusiveness does not 
simply stand for enforced conformity. In this sense, 
successful cooperation also builds on diverse interests 
and capacities. It is crucial, however, that the Chinese 
emphasis on win-win cooperation does not underlie 
the condition of parity. A win-win situation can also 
emerge when, economically, shares are unequally 
distributed.99 
Thirdly, the main task is to build up a comprehensive 
economic and political network that promotes the connec-
tivity between countries along the Silk Road. In this 
regard, the OBOR initiative, on the one hand, comprises 
all kinds of actors within China, including provincial 
and city governments, banks, Confucius institutes, as 
well as national universities. Most external activities 
of these actors are now summarized as part of OBOR.100 
On the other hand, cooperation also takes place in 
very different arrangements, such as multilateral 
mechanisms initiated by China,101 other multilateral 
institutions,102 and bilateral relations. Thus, China 
clearly represents the core of OBOR. Due to the grow-
ing network of cooperation, countries are increasingly 
bound to China, and the significance of each actor is 
defined by its specific position within the Chinese 
OBOR network. 
 
98  In this context, Chinese experts and officials usually point 
to the increasing interest of other countries in participating 
in the OBOR initiative since it was announced. Several meet-
ings of the author with Chinese experts and officials in 2015. 
99  For some countries a disadvantaged relationship with 
China might still be of interest because usually China’s eco-
nomic relations are not tied to any political claims. 
100  This is even the case for the cultural exchange along the 
Silk Road which is a crucial part of the initiative. The main 
goal is to increase the awareness of Chinese culture and lan-
guage in the countries along the Silk Road, as a representa-
tive of the Foreign Committee of the Chinese People’s Politi-
cal Consultative Conference highlighted to the author. 
101  These are for instance the AIIB, the 16+1 mechanism, 
which is the meeting between China and 16 Central and 
Eastern European countries, and several trilateral meetings, 
such as the recent one between Russia, China, and Mongolia. 
102  For example BRICS, the EEU, and the EU. 
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What Is All the Fuss About? 
Over the years, many countries have created a dense 
network of cooperation with China. For example, 
Germany and China alone make use of more than 60 
cooperation mechanisms that foster the relationship 
between governments, political parties, parliaments, 
academia, and think tanks. After all, China is the 
biggest trading country in the world. The interest 
of other countries in building up economic relations 
with China has never waned, despite all the hesita-
tions about China’s real intentions or new assertive-
ness in its foreign policy. This justifies the slightly 
cynical question of what all the fuss concerning the 
Silk Road and OBOR is actually about. 
The polite response to this is as follows: It indeed 
makes a difference that China’s relations with other 
countries are increasingly connected to the OBOR 
initiative. After all, most newly established or already 
existing multilateral cooperation and financial mecha-
nisms – as well as many bilateral relations – are now 
seen as part of OBOR.103 
For instance, Xi Jinping’s visit to the port of Duis-
burg in March 2014 also underscored how the Chinese 
side had already linked his visit of the completion 
of Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe International Railway104 
to the vision of building up a Silk Road between 
Europe, particularly Germany, and China.105 Right 
 
103  The only exception is China’s relationship to the United 
States, which traditionally possesses a special status within 
China’s foreign relations. With reference to OBOR, Chinese 
experts like to highlight that OBOR is also open to the United 
States (at some point) and, further, that it should not simply 
be regarded as a Chinese strategic response to the US re-
balancing to Asia, particularly to the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship trade agreement, of which China is not yet a member. 
This is partly true and partly false. Thus, OBOR is clearly not 
only a response to US activities in Asia – that would be a very 
simplified perspective of the OBOR initiative – but it is still 
also a response to the TPP trade agreement and the Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership, the proposed free 
trade agreement between the EU and the United States, 
which both (until now) exclude China. 
104  It is part of a wide net of transport routes for moving 
goods and people from Asia to Europe. The railway could 
have been made operable already in 2011. 
105  See the headlines of the following news articles and 
statements on governmental websites: “President Xi Calls 
on China, Germany to Build Silk Road Economic Belt”, CCTV, 
30 March 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/2014/03/30/ARTI13961 
37868612808.shtml (accessed 1 September 2015); “President 
Xi Jinping Visits the Port of Duisburg, Germany”, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 30 March 
2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/ 
from the beginning, the Chinese leadership used the 
Silk Road initiatives (and later OBOR) to successfully 
reframe its relations with many states and institutions 
– or even long-standing infrastructure projects – as 
now being a crucial part of establishing OBOR as a 
global network of cooperation and connectivity.106 
This is also the case in China’s relation toward 
Europe. Although there are already many established 
dialogue formats between China and the EU, the for-
mer Chinese leadership decided to announce a new 
dialogue mechanism between China and 16 Central 
and Eastern European countries107 in April 2012 
(“16+1”).108 Today, 16+1 is seen as a crucial element 
of OBOR; this was also evident at the latest meeting in 
Suzhou, the first one in China.109 In addition, China 
also maintains very good bilateral relations with the 
Central and Eastern European countries. In June 2015, 
Hungary was the first EU member state that signed a 
memorandum of understanding promoting China’s 
OBOR initiative. Shortly thereafter, China and Poland 
decided to sign a cooperation agreement linked to the 
OBOR. The agreement promotes stronger bilateral ties 
between the two countries and mainly focuses on the 
development of joint railway projects.110 At first sight, 
 
xjpzxcxdsjhaqhfbfwhlfgdgblshlhgjkezzzbomzb_666590/ 
t1164914.shtml (accessed 1 September 2015). 
106  The BRICS forum is another example. This forum was 
once established as an organisation that could challenge the 
existing global financial structure, and it is most likely still 
perceived as such by most members, but certainly not by 
China. From a Chinese perspective – and this is made very 
clear in the official report on China’s OBOR vision – BRICS, 
and particularly the New Development Bank, are now sum-
marised under the OBOR initiative. This was also discussed at 
the international conference “BRICS: Political Ambitions and 
Opportunities” in Moscow, organised by the Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung Moscow and Deutsch-Russische Auslandshandels-
kammer (30 November – 1 December 2015). 
107  Of the 16 members are 11 EU members. The 16 countries 
are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slowenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania. 
108  Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, “China’s Charm Offensive in 
Central and Eastern Europe: The Implementation of Its ‘12 
Measures’ Strategy”, PISM Bulletin 106, 4 October 2013, https:// 
www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=14927 (accessed 1 September 2015). 
109  See “For China, Central and Eastern Europe, Is 16+1 Really 
Greater than 17?”, Global Times, 13 December 2015, http://www. 
globaltimes.cn/content/958133.shtml (accessed 15 December 
2015).  
110  Conversation between the author and representative of 
the Polish Embassy in Germany. See also “China and Poland 
to Sign ‘One Belt, One Road’ Cooperation Agreement”, Global 
Times, 17 June 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/ 
927483.shtml (accessed 1 September 2015). 
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these documents might only look like another bilateral 
agreement between an individual European country 
and China, but in China these activities are perceived 
as another successful step for building up China’s 
OBOR network of cooperation. 
Hence, European governments (and others) need 
to be aware that OBOR has an impact on their current 
and future relations with China. Most European coun-
tries are already considered as being part of the OBOR 
initiative, either through bilateral agreements or their 
membership in one of the existing formats (16+1, the 
AIIB, the EU, etc.). It seems that many European govern-
ments have already (albeit implicitly) acknowledged 
China’s new vision, without realizing that OBOR could 
indeed have the potential to effectively transform the 
structure of the existing international order. 
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Conclusions 
 
OBOR is China’s most ambitious and visible foreign 
policy initiative of the last three years. Still, OBOR is 
difficult to describe. Explanations often remain diffuse 
and vague. The biggest challenge is to use a language – 
or more precisely an interpretation – that works in 
Chinese as well as in Western languages. This is exactly 
why the imagery of OBOR as an inclusive, open, and 
global network of cooperation has been introduced 
here. Firstly, this idea very much stems from Chinese 
traditional thinking about the organization of society 
and political order. Secondly, the imagery helps us to 
understand the different layers of OBOR, which con-
sists of (at least) three dimensions. First, OBOR is not 
an organization with defined rules but a political vision 
that is flexible, inclusive, and open. OBOR represents a 
loose framework that still can be modified by its par-
ticipants. 
Second, the main goal is to strengthen cooperation 
and connectivity between China and OBOR members. 
In this regard, already existing cooperation formats – 
both bilateral and multilateral – have been increasing-
ly linked to OBOR. Other financial mechanisms, such 
as the AIIB or the Silk Road Fund, were newly estab-
lished to help finance OBOR. Furthermore, from a Chi-
nese perspective, it is not a problem when affiliations 
of certain actors overlap, such as, for instance, in the 
case of Poland, which is a member of the EU, 16+1, 
and the AIIB, and has growing bilateral ties with China 
(all of these affiliations are now summarized under 
the OBOR initiative). Ideally, actors do not need to 
decide between different mechanisms, not even when 
these mechanisms are based on very different rules or 
interests. Third, OBOR is about concrete infrastructure 
projects (communication, energy resources/power 
grid, and transport) that also involve various Chinese 
actors (state-owned enterprises, banks, provincial gov-
ernments, etc.). Consequently, every railway project – 
no matter if it was already initiated long before OBOR 
– investments in seaports, for example in Gwadar and 
Piraeus, or China’s move to set up Special Economic 
Zones in Africa can now easily be linked to OBOR. 
Following this interpretation, the main risk for Euro-
pean countries and the EU in their relations toward 
China is the concentration on individual infrastruc-
ture projects, specific financial mechanisms such as 
the AIIB, and bilateral negotiations without realizing 
that – from the Chinese side – these are all linked to 
OBOR. Thus, a focus on only specific elements of OBOR 
conceals that most of these projects, mechanisms, and 
relations are part of a comprehensive Chinese network 
vision with a potential global reach. In addition, the 
existing ignorance of the broader context of OBOR 
could strengthen Chinese actors in playing individual 
European countries off against the EU, or the EU off 
against mechanisms such as the “16+1” forum. 
In response to OBOR, European countries – in par-
ticular European foreign ministries – firstly need to 
start collecting and distributing information about all 
Chinese OBOR activities in their countries, and maybe 
even in all of Europe. This would make it much easier 
for these countries to actively define in what areas they 
want – or do not want – to cooperate and how they 
could actually benefit from OBOR. It could also mini-
mize the puzzled reactions of European countries and 
the EU, such as, for instance, when Chinese represen-
tatives proposed the idea of a digital Silk Road for Eura-
sia at the last EU-China summit in June 2015. Second-
ly, the focus of the newly established EU connectivity 
platform, which defines a first European response to 
OBOR, is mainly on the identification of joint infra-
structure projects. However, it is important that this 
platform develops into the dominant coordination 
center for all OBOR activities of Chinese actors in the 
EU, particularly since China will also continue to con-
duct bilateral (infrastructure) projects with individual 
European countries. In short, the EU connectivity plat-
form can only be of real value to EU members when it 
turns into the leading EU hub for coordinating OBOR 
activities between Chinese and European actors. 
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Abbreviations 
AIIB Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa  
(association of five major economies) 
EEU Eurasian Economic Union 
EU European Union 
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission 
OBOR One Belt, One Road 
